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INTRODUCTION

Democracy is facing a legitimacy crisis. In 2010, “the number of . . .
‘electoral democracies’ dropped to 115—[the] lowest level since 1995.”1
Democracies consistently perform better than other types of government in
providing health, education, and food to their people,2 and yet dissatisfaction
with democracy rose “by around +10% points, from 47.9 to 57.5%” from 1990
to 2020.3 This increase in dissatisfaction has been seen worldwide, but is
driven by larger, more developed democracies.4
This trend is concerning for those who believe democracy is “the
worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been
tried.”5 It is especially concerning in the United States, where dissatisfaction
with democracy has increased by around one-third of the population in just
one generation.6 When considered within the context of the events of the past
three decades, that increase in dissatisfaction may not be as surprising as it
initially appears.7 In that time, two U.S. presidents have won the electoral
college but lost the popular vote;8 Russia attempted to (and to some extent
successfully did) interfere with an election;9 the former U.S. president and
many of his supporters alleged massive fraud in the most recent presidential
election;10 and polarization, disenfranchisement, and resentment have

1

See JUDITH G. KELLEY, MONITORING DEMOCRACY: WHEN INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION
WORKS, AND WHY IT OFTEN FAILS 4 (2012) (discussing the global retrenchment of
democracy).
2 MORTON H. HALPERIN ET AL., THE DEMOCRACY ADVANTAGE: H OW DEMOCRACIES
PROMOTE PROSPERITY AND PEACE 12 (2005) (explaining that democracies typically achieve
standards of living much higher than countries with other forms of governments).
3 R. S. FOA ET AL., THE GLOBAL SATISFACTION W ITH DEMOCRACY REPORT 2020 2 (2020).
4 See id. at 2 (summarizing the global trend towards increased dissatisfaction with
democracy).
5 THE QUOTABLE W INSTON CHURCHILL 41 (Richard J. Mahoney & Shera Dalin eds., 2005).
6 FOA ET AL., supra note 3, at 2.
7 See FOA ET AL., supra note 3, at 2 (“[C]itizens’ levels of dissatisfaction with democracy
are largely responsive to objective circumstances and events[.]”).
8 See Tara Law, These Presidents Won the Electoral College — But Not the Popular Vote,
TIME (May 15, 2019, 4:58 PM), https://time.com/5579161/presidents-elected-electoralcollege/ (listing the presidents that have won the Electoral College but lost the popular
vote).
9 See S. REP. NO. 116-20 (2019) (outlining the actions Russia took to affect the 2016
Presidential Election).
10 See Clare Hymes, Barr Authorizes U.S. Attorneys to "Pursue Substantial Allegations" of
Voter
Fraud,
CBS
NEWS
(Nov.
10,
2020,
11:43
AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/barr-attorney-general-authorizes-attorneys-pursueallegations-voter-fraud-election/ (discussing a memo in which the Attorney General
authorized government attorneys to pursue “‘substantial allegations’ of voting
irregularities” in the 2020 election).
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continued to grow.11 Though some may say democracy’s popularity is
plummeting because it is unable to respond to today’s problems, history has
shown us that democracy is the best form of government—both for a country’s
people and the world at large.12 Therefore, it is in our individual and collective
interests to promote democracy both domestically and internationally. One
way to promote democracy at home and abroad is through election
monitoring.
This paper will argue that the United States should pass legislation
applying international election observation13 standards in all federal
elections.14 While election observation may seem mundane and irrelevant, the
prolonged declarations of fraud after the 2020 election—as well as the January
6, 2021 riot at the Capitol which was largely fueled by those declarations—
show otherwise.15 Part I discusses the evolution of the international election
11

See The Carter Center Launches Initiative to Strengthen Transparency and Trust in U.S.
Elections,
THE
CARTER
CTR.
(Aug.
28,
2020),
https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/2020/us-elections-082820.html (discussing some of
the various issues facing democracy in the United States).
12 See HALPERIN, supra note 2, at 12, 35, 41 (“Democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with
each other. Indeed, as the number of democracies has been increasing, major conflicts
around the world (including civil wars) have declined sharply. Since 1992, they have fallen
by two thirds . . . .” “Citizens of democracies live longer, healthier, and more productive
lives, on average, than those in autocracies,” and have done so for “the past four decades.”
Also, democracies “score consistently higher on UNDP’s Human Development Index . . .
.”).
13 Election observation is a subset of election monitoring; election observation usually
“suggests a briefer involvement than does monitoring[,]” but “there can be considerable
ambiguity and overlap between these terms” and the “distinction is not rigorous.” ERIC C.
BJORNLUND, BEYOND FREE AND FAIR: MONITORING ELECTIONS AND BUILDING DEMOCRACY
41-42 (2004). Therefore, this paper will use both terms interchangeably.
14 “International election observation standards” sounds too vague to be useful. Practically,
however, though international organizations may use different verbiage to articulate their
standards, the standards themselves are largely identical. See International Election
Observation, Approaches to Observation: Methodology & Tools, ACE PROJECT
(https://aceproject.org/ace-en/focus/international-election-observation/iv.-approaches-toobservation-methodology-and) (explaining that NGOs’ assessments of elections “differ
primarily in their structure, not in their criteria”) (last visited Feb. 22, 2022). Therefore, for
simplicity’s sake, this paper will refer to the guidelines set forth by the International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), which were created
in consultation with the election monitoring arm of the Organization for Security and CoOperation in Europe (OSCE), the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR). See INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE
(INTERNATIONAL IDEA), INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL STANDARDS: GUIDELINES FOR
REVIEWING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ELECTIONS IV (2002) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
ELECTORAL STANDARDS].
15 See Shan Li & Corinne Ramey, What Are Election Observers? Role at Crux of Trump
Lawsuits in Pennsylvania, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2020, 10:14 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-are-election-observers-the-role-at-the-crux-of-trumplawsuits-in-pennsylvania-11605053759; see also Ted Mann & Andrew Restuccia, At the
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observation scheme and highlights instances where domestic and international
election observation has improved democracy worldwide, using Nepal and
Tunisia as case studies. Part II explains the election administration system in
the United States, the current status of election observation within the United
States, and discusses some contested federal elections in the country’s history
whose controversies could have been mitigated by robust election monitoring.
Part III outlines how election observation might be statutorily implemented in
the United States, and addresses counterarguments against doing so.
Election observation could be especially useful in the United States,
which “has long fallen short of international election standards in several key
areas[.]”16 Fiascos such as the 2000 election have shown that the United
States’ current election system is flawed.17 In addition to polarization, foreign
interference, and disenfranchisement, COVID-19 threatened to overwhelm
the already strained electoral apparatus.18 These threats not only show just
how vulnerable democracy in the United States is, but call for action to
buttress our democracy. Enacting federal legislation implementing
international election observation standards nationwide—which would permit
domestic observers to oversee every facet of all federal elections—would be
a relatively simple, yet effective, way to accomplish this.
In today’s political climate, discussion often focuses on reforming
campaign finance laws, or ending the war on drugs, or fighting systemic
racism, or any number of issues that (while important) seem almost too
overwhelming for our society to address quickly. Election administration
(which election observation is a facet of) seems far less interesting—almost
too basic to be important. However, mastery of the basic fundamentals is vital
to success in any endeavor.19 Furthermore, the 2020 election has shown just
how impactful election administration can be.20 Genuine, legitimate,
trustworthy elections participated in by an engaged public are fundamental to
U.S. Capitol, Milling Crowd Sparked Riot in a Few Crucial Minutes, WALL ST. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/at-the-u-s-capitol-a-milling-crowd-sparked-a-riot-in-a-fewcrucial-minutes-11610067766 (last updated Jan. 8, 2020, 1:12 PM) (explaining that the riot
was largely instigated by President Trump’s refusal to accept defeat in the 2020 election).
16 Carter Center Launches Initiative to Strengthen Transparency and Trust in U.S.
Elections, supra note 11.
17 BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 6 (“[T]here is nothing inherently superior about the
American political system. . . .”).
18 Org. for Sec. and Co-operation in Eur., OSCE Office for Democratic Insts. & Human
Rights, United States of America General Elections 3 Nov. 2020 ODIHR Needs Assessment
Mission Report, (Feb. 9, 2021).
19 Dennis M. Docheff, Learning from the Legends: Leadership Tips for Coaches,
STRATEGIES: J. FOR PHYSICAL & SPORT EDUCATORS at 30-31 (Nov. 8, 2013),
https://cdn3.sportngin.com/attachments/document/0052/6886/Learning_from_Legends.p
df (discussing the philosophy of famous coaches such as Vince Lombardi and John
Wooden).
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a healthy democracy,21 and election observation is a proven way to ensure
elections meet those standards.22 It is time for the United States to use election
observation to remaster the most fundamental aspect of democratic
governance: elections.
II.

ELECTION OBSERVATION WORLDWIDE

Election observation, which started as far back as 1857,23 is the
“primary tool the international community uses to assess the legitimacy of
governments”24 and is one of the most visible forms of democracy promotion
worldwide.25 Observers can be either citizens of the country holding the
elections or foreign observers from the international community.26 As election
observation has become more common, it has also become more influential
and is now sought after by governments who want to be seen as legitimate
(either because they actually are, or because they want to be perceived as
such).27 The international election observation system, which includes

20

See
2020
Election
Litigation
Tracker,
SCOTUSBLOG,
https://www.scotusblog.com/election-litigation/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2022) (tracking all
the suits filed regarding the 2020 election, almost all of which regard a dispute over how
States administered their respective elections).
21 BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 7.
22 See PATRICK MERLOE, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
(NDI), THE CARTER CENTER, UNITED NATIONS ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE DIVISION
(UNEAD), DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION 2
(2005) [hereinafter DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES] (Election observation can “enhance the
integrity of election processes” by “deterring and exposing irregularities and fraud[,] . . .
providing recommendations for improving electoral processes[,] . . . promot[ing] public
confidence[,] . . . promot[ing] electoral participation[,] and mitigat[ing] the potential for
election-related conflict.”); SANJAY GATHIA, ASEAN WORKSHOP ON ELECTION
OBSERVATION: INCREMENTAL STEPS TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ASEAN
ELECTION OBSERVATION MECHANISM 16 (Andrew Ellis & Adhy Aman eds., 2015)
(Election observers can “rais[e] voter confidence, [give] reassurance, [and] provid[e]
credible and essential feedbacks before [the elections], during the elections, and after the
elections are over.”); BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 9 (explaining that election observation
spurs democracy by “energizing civic organizations and drawing people into public
affairs”).
23 KELLEY, supra note 1, at 16.
24 KELLEY, supra note 1, at 7.
25
See BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 9 (contextualizing the development of international
and domestic election monitoring).
26 See BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 9 (outlining the various types of election observation,
and discussing the strengths of domestic observation as opposed to international
observation).
27 See BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 8-9 (discussing several factors that have contributed
to the growth of election observation, including increased focus on human rights after the
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observation by both foreign nations and domestic observers, has evolved over
time from an ad hoc activity of Western academics to a powerful force in the
international sphere.28
A. The Development of Global Election Observation Norms
i.

The History of International and Domestic Election
Observation

The first election observation mission was sent in 1857 by a
European Commission established by the Treaty of Paris to observe the
second election concerning the unification of Moldovia and Wallachia
following the Crimean War, after the Ottoman Empire attempted to
manipulate the first one.29 While election observation as a way to ensure the
legitimacy of other countries’ elections may have started then, it did not come
into its own until after the creation of the United Nations (UN). 30 Democracy
promotion in general has been a goal of Western governments since the UN
was created.31 The UN Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) fueled
independence movements in formerly colonial states, and some of the first
observation missions the UN undertook were small missions to oversee
referenda on independence for countries under UN trusteeship.32 Some of the
earliest election missions were sent to Korea in 1948, British Togoland in
1956, and French Togoland in 1958.33 These missions, though small, gave
international legitimacy to the states and reinforced the outcome of the
elections.34
By the early 1960s, other organizations began observing elections as
well: the Organization of American States (OAS)—which pioneered

Cold War, the end of colonialism and the concomitant need for legitimate governments in
formerly colonial states, and others).
28 See BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 8 (discussing the spread of election observation into
a powerful international norm).
29 See KELLEY, supra note 1, at 16 (tracing the beginnings of election observation).
30 KELLEY, supra note 1, at 16.
31 See International Election Observation, Origins & Evolution of Election Observation,
ACE PROJECT, https://aceproject.org/ace-en/focus/international-election-observation/iii.origins-and-evolution-of-international (last visited Feb. 15, 2022) (analyzing the reasons
why election observation became so popular).
32 See id. (discussing the development of election observation).
33See id. (discussing the early UN election observation missions).
34 See id. (quoting YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES,
REFERENDA, & NATIONAL ELECTIONS 133 (1994)) (quoting the UN Commissioner, who
said that “the outcome of the elections faithfully reflects the wishes of the people of
Togoland.”).
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monitoring in sovereign states35—sent its first election observation mission to
Costa Rica in 1962,36 and the Commonwealth Secretariat (CS) began
observing elections in British-controlled regions during that time.37 Election
observation remained a constant, albeit fairly infrequent, phenomenon until
the mid-to-late 1980s.38 The Carter Center (CC) began observing elections
around that time, and what would become the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)—which currently observes elections through
its Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)39—decided
to send out election monitors in 1990.40 The number of election monitoring
organizations, as well as the number of observed elections, exploded around
the turn of the century; less than 10% of elections in non-established
democracies were observed in 1986, while around 85% were observed in
2004.41
Three norms were particularly important in creating and shaping the
concept of election monitoring: self-determination, free expression, and
genuine and periodic elections.42 These norms developed and evolved during
the period after World War II through the UN’s Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, and the CS’s Declaration of Commonwealth
Principles.43 These democratic norms could not be fully realized worldwide,
however, as long as “longstanding norms of sovereignty and noninterference”
dissuaded states from engaging with the internal elections of other states.44
As time went on, global human rights issues such as apartheid in
South Africa and the harsh rule of dictators (such as Saddam Hussein in Iraq)
began to convince the international community that states could legitimately
35

See KELLEY, supra note 1, at 19 (discussing the evolution of international election
observation).
36 See International Election Observation, Origins & Evolution of Election Observation,
supra note 31 (discussing election observation by organizations other than the UN).
37 See KELLEY, supra note 1, at 16 (explaining how election observation increased in
popularity).
38 See KELLEY, supra note 1, at 16 (discussing the increase in election observation over the
twentieth century); see also KELLEY, supra note 1, at 17 fig. 2.1 (showing the increasing
commonality of election monitoring from 1976-2004).
39 See OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, OSCE,
https://www.osce.org/odihr (last visited Feb. 15, 2022) (discussing the origins of the
OSCE).
40 See KELLEY, supra note 1, at 16 (showing how election observation became increasingly
popular over time).
41
KELLEY, supra note 1, at 16 (illustrating the global explosion of election observation).
42 KELLEY, supra note 1, at 21 (outlining the global norms that fueled the growth of election
observation).
43 See KELLEY, supra note 1, at 21-22 (tracking the development of democratic norms in
the period after World War II, and how various regional agreements, international
agreements, and international organizations informed and precipitated that development).
44 KELLEY, supra note 1, at 22.
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intervene in other states’ domestic affairs to promote human rights and
democracy.45 Thus, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, the norms that fueled
election observation (self-determination, freedom of expression, and
participatory rights) had grown in strength, while the norms that served as
barriers to election observation (sovereignty and noninterference) had
weakened, creating a perfect environment for election monitoring to expand. 46
The end of the Cold War provided the crucial spark needed for these
three norms to explode across the world, and election observation exploded
with them.47 Western countries, who prioritized security interests during the
Cold War, began to prioritize global democratic changes instead. 48
Furthermore, the focus of election observation shifted from ensuring selfdetermination to advancing democracy in formerly authoritarian countries. 49
Western actors largely spearheaded the election observation movement, with
the United States specifically supporting and staffing the majority of the
missions, as well as creating many of the guidelines for the burgeoning
international election observation apparatus.50 This movement helped fuel the
worldwide explosion of democracy that occurred at the end of the Cold War,
when over eighty-one countries took significant steps toward democracy.51
The end of the Cold War also boosted the demand for election
monitoring because many countries were in times of governmental transition,
and looked to international election observation as a way to provide
legitimacy to their governments.52 While the initial demand for outside
observers was driven largely by governments honestly seeking legitimacy,
eventually even dishonest governments embraced election observation
because “the wave of invitations extended by honest governments made
monitoring sufficiently prevalent to stigmatize governments that refused to
invite monitors.”53 Demand for election monitoring also rose as foreign aid
45

See KELLEY, supra note 1, at 22-23 (showing how the normative environment shifted
during the 1900s).
46 KELLEY, supra note 1, at 22-23 (detailing the weakening of norms of sovereignty and
nonintervention, fueled in large part by human rights treaties which could be enforced
against states by international bodies such as the International Court of Justice).
47 KELLEY, supra note 1, at 26 (discussing how the Cold War provided a “crucial opening”
for democratic norms and election observation).
48 KELLEY, supra note 1, at 26 (explaining why election observation grew in popularity
after the Cold War).
49 See International Election Observation, Origins & Evolution of Election Observation,
supra note 31 (discussing how opportunities to observe elections, especially in Eastern
Europe and Latin America, shifted election observers’ priorities).
50
See KELLEY, supra note 1, at 26-27 (discussing the role Western states had in developing
the norms and procedures of election observation).
51 See BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 6-7 (discussing the increase in democratic countries
after 1980).
52 See KELLEY, supra note 1; see also BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 27 (highlighting
specifically election observation missions in Mexico, Mozambique, Guyana, and Zambia).
53 BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 29.
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from Western governments increasingly came to be seen as tied to democratic
governance.54
Domestic election observation also expanded during this time.55
Domestic election observation differs from international election observation
in that the people watching the polls are citizens of the country holding the
election.56 Domestic observation first began in the Philippines in 1983 in
response to the assassination of popular Filipino opposition leader Benigno
Aquino under Ferdinand Marcos’ dictatorial government.57 Concerned
citizens gathered together and formed the National Citizens’ Movement for
Free Elections (NAMFREL), which was dedicated to promoting election
observation by Filipino citizens.58 NAMFREL mobilized hundreds of
thousands of volunteer poll watchers to observe the 1984 congressional
election and 1986 presidential election.59 In both elections, NAMFREL was
able to tabulate votes well before the ruling party could announce the results,
which underscored the illegitimacy of the respective elections and led to
Marcos’ resignation shortly after the 1986 election.60
NAMFREL’s stunning success inspired domestic observation
organizations around the globe.61 The United States-based National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) sent a mission to learn
from NAMFREL’s work in the 1986 election, and the two organizations
cooperated to spread their experience throughout the world, sending missions
and supporting domestic observation operations in Bangladesh, Zambia,
Nicaragua in the 1990s.62 In that same decade, domestic observation and voter
54

See BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 29; see also International Election Observation,
Origins & Evolution of Election Observation, supra note 31; KELLEY, supra note 1, at 26,
29 (discussing specifically elections in Indonesia in 1999, Kenya in 1992, Zimbabwe in
2002, and Uganda in 1996 as times when “donor countries pressur[ed] governments to
invite monitors”).
55 See BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 210 (explaining that domestic election-monitoring
organizations have expanded since the 1980s).
56 See BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 9 (“National civic organizations and citizen networks
across the globe have mobilized to monitor watershed elections in their own countries.”).
57 See BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 211 (outlining Marcos’ rise to power and the creation
of NAMFREL).
58 See BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 211-12 (discussing the creation and early development
of NAMFREL).
59 See BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 213-15 (discussing NAMFREL’s activities in the 1984
election and 1986 “snap” presidential election, which Marcos unexpectedly announced live
on American television four months before it was to be held).
60
See BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 215 (discussing how Marcos was pushed out by a
combination of popular protests, opposition by the military, and eventual abandonment by
the Reagan administration).
61 See BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 217-18 (discussing the global proliferation of
NAMFREL’s model of domestic election observation).
62 See BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 218 (discussing the partnership between NDI and
NAMFREL).
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education organizations sprung up in Chile, Panama, Paraguay, the
Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Namibia,
Thailand, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Yemen.63 Domestic election
observers can be nonpartisan or partisan, but governments have felt
“increasingly threatened by the potential power of nonpartisan monitoring
groups. . . .”64 These domestic election observation groups, especially when
working in concert with international election observers, can significantly
improve democratic outcomes in their countries.65
ii.

The Methodology of Election Observation

Although election observation became entrenched as an international
political norm over the course of the twentieth century, observers needed to
find a way to translate the democratic ideals that fueled their observation into
concrete methodology that could be used to evaluate elections.
The most difficult challenge [of election observation] is to
evaluate the extent and significance of observed problems
during various stages of the election, and to assess the degree
to which they fundamentally undermine the integrity of the
entire election and the final results. Such analysis raises the
core question of how much weight or value to give to various
parts of the electoral process and the relevant obligations.66

63 See BJORNLUND, supra

note 13, at 219-21 (showing the rapid spread of domestic election
observation organizations and discussing the positive effects they had on their respective
countries’ elections).
64 BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 227; see also THE CARTER CTR. & THE N AT’L CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, A GUIDE TO ELECTION OBSERVER POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES
1 (2016) [hereinafter GUIDE TO ELECTION OBSERVER POLICIES IN THE US] (explaining that
domestic election observers can be sent by parties, candidates, nonpartisan citizen groups
or independent organizations).
65 See BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 245, 255 (“[I]nternational observers and the
international community provide moral, political, technical, and financial support to help
create political space for domestic monitoring and improve the effectiveness and
professionalism of that monitoring.” Meanwhile, domestic observation is recognized
internationally as an effective means to “deter fraud, improve confidence, and increase
transparency” in elections.).
66 International Election Observation, Approaches to Observation: Methodology & Tools,
supra note 14 (footnote omitted) (quoting David J. Carroll and Avery Davis-Roberts, The
Carter Center and Election Observation: An Obligations-Based Approach for Assessing
Elections, 12 ELECTION L. J. 87, 93 (2013)).
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Although election observation exploded from the 1980’s to early 2000’s,
election observation organizations were unorganized in their approach. 67
Public international law (comprised of treaties, judicial decisions, political
commitments, and other sources of best practice) undergirded observation
practices, but organizations had not determined how to translate countries’
obligations under public international law into effective assessment
frameworks for their elections.68
In an attempt to standardize worldwide election observation, twentytwo election observation organizations gathered at the UN in 2005 to sign the
Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of
Conduct for International Election Observers.69 The Declaration of
Principles lists twenty-four principles for observers to use to evaluate a
country’s electoral process, and twelve standards of conduct for observers to
abide by as they oversee elections.70 In addition, treaties such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the African Union’s
Charter on Human and People’s Rights, and the European Council’s
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
impose obligations on their signatory states that election observation
organizations can use to compel states to change their behavior.71 The Carter
Center and International IDEA have enumerated twenty-one obligations
countries have pertaining to elections—each one of them drawn from an
international treaty, and thus having the force of international law.72 Other
organizations may use different terminology to evaluate elections, but all
election observation organizations share (functionally) the same criteria for
evaluating the legitimacy of elections.73
Election observation organizations could not be satisfied, however,
with merely enumerating high-minded principles; they needed to create a
system for translating those principles into quantifiable metrics to evaluate
67 See BJORNLUND, supra

note 13, at 8 (explaining that the approach to election observation
at this time could best be described as “ad hoc”).
68 See International Election Observation, Approaches to Observation: Methodology &
Tools, supra note 14 (discussing the development of election observation norms).
69 See International Election Observation, Origins & Evolution of Election Observation,
supra note 31; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 22; PATRICK MERLOE, NDI, THE
CARTER CTR., UNEAD, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVERS 1-3
(2005) [hereinafter CODE OF CONDUCT] (explaining the genesis of the Declaration of
Principles).
70 See DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 22, at 1-8 (asserting principles which
effective election observation organizations should adhere to).
71See ACE PROJECT, supra note 14 (discussing how election observation organizations use
international law to affect states’ behavior).
72 See ACE PROJECT, supra note 14 (discussing the synergy between international law and
international election observation organizations).
73 See ACE PROJECT, supra note 14 (explaining the similarities and differences of various
election monitoring organizations’ criteria for evaluating elections).
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elections. One way observation organizations do this is by election-day
checklists.74 Election observation missions are usually divided between shortterm observers (who are mostly focused on the election itself) and long-term
observers (who assess the entire election process).75 These checklists allow
short-term observers to quantitatively evaluate election procedures and report
their findings to the long-term observers.76 Many organizations have mobile
technology that allows short-term observers to report their findings back to
the long-term observers rapidly; such technology was used successfully in
Liberia, Egypt, Kenya, Libya, and Nepal.77 Ideally, international election
observation missions would partner with domestic election observation
organizations to improve the efficacy of their observation mission. 78
As the previous section discussed in relation to the Philippines in
1986, the ability to quickly tabulate votes and disseminate the tallies to the
public is a powerful tool for election observation organizations. Given that
manipulation of the election results is a common concern in elections, it is
vitally important for observers to independently verify the results “on the basis
of a comprehensive assessment or by analyzing random samples of observed
ballot counts.” 79 One way to independently analyze election results is by a
“quick count,” also called a “parallel vote tabulation” (PVT). 80 PVTs use
“statistical sampling to project results or to assess the accuracy of reported
results, within statistically significant margins of error.”81 They do not involve
a parallel tabulation of every vote because doing so would be too expensive,
time consuming, and inaccurate.82 PVTs “deter or detect ballot count fraud . .

74

See ACE PROJECT, supra note 14 (outlining the use of checklists by election observation
organizations, as well as the difficulties of making accurate (yet concise) quantitative
checklists for elections).
75 See ACE PROJECT, supra note 14 (comparing the roles of short-term and long-term
election observers).
76 See ACE PROJECT, supra note 14 (explaining the importance of quickly and accurately
reporting information).
77 See ACE PROJECT, supra note 14 (highlighting specifically the use of the Carter Center’s
ELMO (Election Monitoring) system); see also INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL STANDARDS,
supra note 14 (listing the criteria by which observers should evaluate a state’s election
apparatus).
78 See BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 243 (“[I]nternational observers can draw directly on
information from the much broader, more geographically disbursed network of domestic
monitors.”).
79
BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 279.
80 See BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 280 (discussing the importance of PVTs).
81 BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 280.
82 See BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 284 (explaining that “monitors can never collect
results from all the polling stations in a country, even under the best circumstances” and
“civic groups . . . generally cannot process and interpret such an enormous amount of data
in a reasonable time.”).
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. by independently collecting election results to compare them with official
results.”83
PVTs have been wildly successful in exposing vote-count fraud,
“convincing authoritarian incumbents to accept electoral defeats[,]” and
legitimizing electoral victories in “polarized political environments[.]” 84
Domestic and international observation organizations have greatly reduced
the problem of vote count fraud worldwide through the use of PVTs.85 As long
as effective observation is permitted, observers will almost certainly be able
to deter or detect vote count fraud using PVTs.86
One way that election observation organizations are beginning to
consider how to effectively strengthen democracies is by combating
“infodemics,” the massive spread of disinformation online.87 False
information, spread by foreign or domestic actors, can undermine credible
elections by eroding public trust in democratic norms and practices.88 While
it is sometimes difficult to determine what is fact and what is fiction, election
observation organizations are uniquely suited to spread accurate information
concerning elections (which is the most effective way to fight
disinformation)89 because they are in a position to know more about a
particular election than almost any other group. Disinformation, however, has
several advantages over accurate information, and election observation
organizations are just starting to grapple with what the best practices should
be to combat disinformation.90 Though this is an emerging facet of election
observation, election observation organizations worldwide are taking concrete

83BJORNLUND,

supra note 13, at 281.
BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 281-282. Elections positively impacted by PVTs include
Chile in 1988 and 1990, Panama and Paraguay in 1989, Bulgaria in 1990, Zambia in 1991,
and Serbia in 2000.
85 See BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 282 (This is true “even in countries with regimes
willing to do almost anything to remain in power.”).
86 See BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 282 (emphasizing the effectiveness of PVTs in
combating electoral fraud).
87 The Forum on Human Rights, Risks To Human Rights And Credible Elections During
An
Online
‘Infodemic’,
YOUTUBE
(Oct.
7,
2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pKgqw6GU4b8&feature=youtu.be.
88 See id. (discussing the harm disinformation can have on the democratic process).
89 See id. (discussing the best way to combat disinformation).
90
See RAFAEL SCHMUZIGER GOLDZWEIG ET AL., OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDS, SOCIAL MEDIA
MONITORING DURING ELECTIONS: CASES AND BEST PRACTICE TO INFORM ELECTORAL
OBSERVATION MISSIONS, 5-6 (2019) (discussing the difficulties of combating
disinformation, such as disinformation’s head-start against the truth; the fact that election
monitoring organizations (EMOs) must be reactive in responding to disinformation; and
the ability of disinformation to change forms and platforms, while EMOs must adhere to
particular methodologies).
84
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steps to create and implement strategies to counteract disinformation,
especially on social media.91
B. Election Observation in Action—Nepal and Tunisia
Election observation has been used successfully in many countries
worldwide. Here, this Note will highlight two countries where election
observation has been particularly noteworthy: Nepal and Tunisia. These
countries have different histories, but both of them overcame a tumultuous
past twenty years (or more) to establish themselves as burgeoning
democracies, and have been trending increasingly more democratic over the
past several years.92
i.

Nepal

Nepal’s history as a state stretches back to 1768, when Prithvi
Rarayan Shah conquered the city of Kathmandu and declared it and the
surrounding territory to be one state.93 The Shah’s ruled as monarchs until the
mid-1800’s, when the Rana family took power and pushed the Shah family
into a merely ceremonial role.94 This role continued until the Nepali Congress
party (backed by the Shah monarch) overthrew the government in 1950,
which instituted a time of political unrest culminating in a coup by the Shah
monarch in 1960.95 The Shah monarchs instituted a system of government
called the Panchayat, which was a system of direct rule by the monarch and
various advisory councils.96 This system continued until the “People’s
Movement” (Jana Andolan) in 1990 forced the monarchy to agree to a
constitutional monarchy, though the country remained defined in the

91

See id. Annex 1 at 34-35 (showing the steps various election observation organizations
have taken, and plan to take, to combat disinformation).
92
See
Freedom
House,
Explore
the
Map,
FREEDOM
HOUSE,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/nepal/freedom-world/2021 (last visited Feb. 21, 2022)
(scoring Nepal with a “Freedom Score” based on political rights and civil liberties);
Freedom
House,
Explore
the
Map,
FREEDOM
HOUSE,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/tunisia/freedom-world/2021 (last visited Feb. 21, 2022)
(scoring Tunisia with a “Freedom Score” based on political rights and civil liberties).
93 See THE CARTER CTR., OBSERVING THE 2008 NEPAL CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTION,
APRIL 2008, at 16 (2008) [hereinafter OBSERVING NEPAL’S 2008 ELECTION] (tracing the
development of Nepal as a state).
94 See id. at 16, 21 (discussing the history of the Nepalese government).
95 See id. (explaining the history of Nepal); see also Encyclopedia Britannica, Nepal,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/Nepal/History (last visited
March 7, 2022) (discussing the rise and fall of the Shah monarchy).
96 See id. (same).
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constitution as a “Hindu monarchical kingdom.”97 The primary political
parties through the 1990’s were the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party
of Nepal, but several small political parties grew disillusioned with the new
government, with one small leftist party (the Communist Party of NepalMaoist) beginning an armed rebellion against the government in 1996.98
In 2001, the King’s brother took over the monarchy after multiple
members of the royal family were killed (ostensibly by the Crown Prince,
though the Nepalese people were skeptical of that account).99 The new King
centralized authority by ousting the elected Prime Minister in 2002, and
staged a coup in 2005—claiming it was necessary to address the Maoist
rebellion.100 After the coup, several political parties (including the Maoists)
agreed to join together to oppose the King, and to draft a new constitution.101
This movement led to the Jana Andolan II in 2006, which forced the King to
cede power and began the country’s transition to a secular, federal democratic
republic.102 The political parties intended to hold elections for a constituent
assembly and draft a constitution within two years but tensions between the
parties, strikes and demonstrations by marginalized groups, and various
degrees of communal tensions within the country delayed the process. 103
Elections for constituent assemblies were held in 2008 and 2013, but the new
constitution was not adopted until 2015, after which elections were held for
the legislature in 2017.104 Elections continued to be held after, though the
country is presently in some turmoil after the dissolution of Parliament by the
Prime Minister, then again by the President.105

See id. at 16-17; THE CARTER CTR., OBSERVING NEPAL’S 2013 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
ELECTION FINAL REPORT 19 (2014) [hereinafter OBSERVING NEPAL’S 2013 ELECTION]
(same).
98 See OBSERVING NEPAL’S 2008 ELECTION, supra note 93, at 17 (explaining the history of
Nepal).
97

See OBSERVING NEPAL’S 2013 ELECTION, supra note 97, at 20.
See OBSERVING NEPAL’S 2013 ELECTION, supra note 97, at 20.
101 See OBSERVING NEPAL’S 2013 ELECTION, supra note 97, at 20.
102 See OBSERVING NEPAL’S 2013 ELECTION, supra note 97, at 20.
103 See OBSERVING NEPAL’S 2013 ELECTION, supra note 97, at 20-24 (discussing the
difficulties surrounding the adoption of a new constitution); see generally Charles
Haviland, Why is Nepal's new constitution controversial?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2015),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34280015 (explaining that at least forty people had
died in clashes connected to the new constitution).
104
See OBSERVING NEPAL’S 2013 ELECTION, supra note 97, at 21; Haviland, Why is Nepal's
new constitution controversial?; THE CARTER CTR., ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION
NEPAL, FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS, 2017 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 2 (2017)
[hereinafter OBSERVING NEPAL’S 2017 ELECTION] (discussing the 2015 constitution and
subsequent elections).
105 Gopal Sharma, Nepal president dissolves parliament, new election in November,
REUTERS (May 21, 2021, 8:46 PM), https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/nepal99
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Election observation was utilized throughout the past decade to assist
the Nepalese people in their goal of transitioning to a democratic government.
The Carter Center first operated in Nepal in 2003 and observed the 2008,
2013, and 2017 elections.106 The Asian Network for Free Elections
(ANFREL) and the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU
EOM) observed the 2008, 2013, and 2017 elections as well.107 Many
international observation groups directly assisted domestic observation
groups: International IDEA provided its Electoral Risk Management Tool
(ERMTool) to the Election Observation Committee of Nepal (EOC) to use
while monitoring the 2017 election,108 and ANFREL facilitated discussions
among domestic groups to help them cooperate more effectively. 109 In
addition to evaluating the election, international observers played an
important role by further legitimize the domestic election observation groups
in Nepal.110 Nepal’s elections were generally regarded as imperfect, but
successful overall, and as important steps toward realizing genuine democracy
in the country.111
Domestic observation groups have been an integral part of the
democratic transition in Nepal. In the 2008 election, Domestic election
observation groups (including Democracy Election Alliance Nepal
(“DEAN”), the National Election Observation Committee (“NEOC”), the
General Election Observation Committee (“GEOC”), the National Election
Monitoring Alliance (“NEMA”), and others) were just beginning to organize
themselves, yet the Carter Center reported that the various observation groups
fielded over 61,000 observers, and domestic observers appeared in 86 percent

president-dissolves-parliament-new-election-november-2021-05-22/ (discussing recent
developments in Nepalese politics).
106 See OBSERVING NEPAL’S 2013 ELECTION, supra note 97, at 21; OBSERVING NEPAL’S
2017 ELECTION, supra note 104, at 1 (outlining the Carter Center’s involvement in Nepal).
107 Mission Reports, ASIAN NETWORK FOR FREE ELECTIONS (last visited Feb. 22, 2022),
https://anfrel.org/category/mission-reports/; European Parliament Global Democracy
Support [herenafter ANFREL]; Election Observation, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/globaldemocracysupport/en/elections/electionobservation (last visited Feb. 22, 2022).
108 Diwas Pant, Election Observers Make Use of the ERM Tool in Nepal (Mar. 9, 2018),
https://www.idea.int/news-media/news/election-observers-make-use-erm-tool-nepal.
109 ANFREL, THE INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION OF THE ASIAN
NETWORK FOR FREE ELECTIONS TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NEPAL’S 2017 PROVINCIAL
AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS 3 (2018) [hereinafter ANFREL OBSERVING NEPAL’S
2017 ELECTION].
110 See OBSERVING NEPAL’S 2013 ELECTION, supra note 97, at 14 (discussing the Carter
Center’s goals in their election observation mission).
111 See OBSERVING NEPAL’S 2008 ELECTION, supra note 93, at 11; OBSERVING NEPAL’S
2013 ELECTION, supra note 97, at 4; OBSERVING NEPAL’S 2017 ELECTION, supra note 104,
at 1-2.
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of the polling locations visited by Carter Center observers.112 Domestic
observers took a primarily passive role in the 2008 election, but were more
organized for the 2013 election, where over 31,000 observers were accredited
from 46 organizations, and were in 74 percent of polling locations visited by
Carter Center observers.113 By the 2017 election, while observers were only
present in 32 percent of polling locations visited by Carter Center observers—
due to financial concerns and an abbreviated election season—114 they (and
the domestic observer groups they represented) had formed a vibrant,
sophisticated observational network which allowed them to
“comprehensively monitor the electoral and the electoral environment”115 and
“greatly contribut[e] to the transparency of the process.”116
ii.

Tunisia

Tunisia has been in an ongoing state of democratic transition since
the Jasmine Revolution in 2011.117 Between Tunisia’s independence and the
Jasmine Revolution, only two presidents served: Habib Bourguiba, who was
instrumental in Tunisia’s independence, and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who
removed the former president via a “medical coup” in 1987.118 Ben Ali’s rule
as president was “characterized by authoritarian control and political
repression.”119 Ben Ali’s rule was upended, however, by the Jasmine
Revolution.120 While Tunisians had chafed for years under Bourguiba’s rule,
popular opposition to the government intensified after a man named
Mohamed Bouazizi set himself ablaze to protest the government’s
repression.121 Ben Ali’s promises of democratic reform were not accepted by
the populace, who had overwhelmingly turned against him; he fled the
country less than a month after Bouazizi’s act of protest.122
See OBSERVING NEPAL’S 2008 ELECTION, supra note 93, at 9, 37, 47, 95 (discussing the
presence and impact of domestic election observers in the 2008 election).
113 See OBSERVING NEPAL’S 2013 ELECTION, supra note 97, at 46, 53.
114 OBSERVING NEPAL’S 2017 ELECTION, supra note 104, at 12.
115 OBSERVING NEPAL’S 2017 ELECTION, supra note 104, at 17-18.
116 OBSERVING NEPAL’S 2017 ELECTION, supra note 104, at 12.
117 THE CARTER CTR., 2019 PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN T UNISIA
FINAL REPORT (2020) 20 [hereinafter OBSERVING TUNISIA’S 2019 ELECTION].
118 THE CARTER CTR., NATIONAL CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS IN T UNISIA OCTOBER
23, 2011 FINAL REPORT (2012) [hereinafter OBSERVING TUNISIA’S 2011 ELECTION].
119 OBSERVING TUNISIA’S 2011 ELECTION, supra note 118, at 13.
120
OBSERVING TUNISIA’S 2011 ELECTION, supra note 118, at 14; see also Encyclopedia
Britannica,
Jasmine
Revolution,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA
https://www.britannica.com/event/Jasmine-Revolution (last visited March 7, 2022)
(discussing the Jasmine Revolution) [hereinafter Jasmine Revolution].
121 OBSERVING TUNISIA’S 2011 ELECTION, supra note 118, at 14.; see also Jasmine
Revolution (discussing the aftermath of Bouazizi’s act).
122 OBSERVING TUNISIA’S 2011 ELECTION, supra note 118, at 14.
112
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The Jasmine Revolution and subsequent democratic transition was
remarkable both in its effect in the region (instigating a wave of popular
uprisings known as the “Arab Spring”) and its largely bloodless nature.123 The
government initially sought to continue under the 1959 Constitution, but
demand for a new constitution was relentless, and an election for a Constituent
Assembly to draft a new constitution was set for July 2011.124 The debate over
the Constitution lasted several years, and was prolonged by instances of
political violence, violent uprisings, and tensions between Islamist and secular
parties.125 Despite setbacks, a new constitution was adopted in 2014, and
elections (the first democratic and transparent elections in the country’s
history) were held later that year.126 Democratic reforms and national
development stagnated in the years after 2014, which caused many people to
become disillusioned with the new government, and the country has yet to
establish a court to resolve constitutional disputes.127 Nonetheless, the 2019
elections were successful, and represented the first transfer of power from one
democratically elected president to another in the nation’s history. 128 Tunisia
thus serves as an impressive example of democratic governance in the wake
of longstanding authoritarian rule.129
Election observation served an important role in Tunisia’s transition
to a democracy. The Tunisian government accredited 661 international
observers during the 2011 election,130 496 international observers during the
2014 election,131 and 700 observers for the 2019 election.132 The Carter
Center, the National Democracy Institute (NDI), and the EU EOM observed
the 2011, 2014, and 2019 elections, while the Electoral Institute for
Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) joined with the Carter Center to
observe the 2011 and 2019 elections.133 EISA also sent technical assessment
OBSERVING TUNISIA’S 2011 ELECTION, supra note 118, at 14.
OBSERVING TUNISIA’S 2011 ELECTION, supra note 118, at 15.
125 THE CARTER CTR., LEGISLATIVE AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN TUNISIA: OCTOBER,
NOVEMBER, AND DECEMBER 2014 FINAL REPORT 18-20 (2015) [hereinafter OBSERVING
TUNISIA’S 2014 ELECTIONS].
126 Id. at 18, 21.
127 OBSERVING TUNISIA’S 2019 ELECTION, supra note 117, at 5-6; Reuters, Tunisian
President Resists Parliament's Bid to Create Constitutional Court, REUTERS (Apr. 6, 2021,
9:43 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-tunisia-politics/tunisian-president-resistsparliaments-bid-to-create-constitutional-court-idUSKBN2BT1PF.
128 OBSERVING TUNISIA’S 2019 ELECTION, supra note 117, at 20.
129 OBSERVING TUNISIA’S 2019 ELECTION, supra note 117, at 6.
130 OBSERVING TUNISIA’S 2011 ELECTION, supra note 118, at 40.
131
OBSERVING TUNISIA’S 2014 ELECTION, supra note 125, at 96.
132 OBSERVING TUNISIA’S 2019 ELECTION, supra note 117, at 121.
133
Election
Observation,
EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT,
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/globaldemocracysupport/en/elections/electionobservation (last visited Feb. 15, 2022); Election Reports, THE CARTER CENTER,
https://www.cartercenter.org/news/publications/election_reports.html#tunisia (last visited
Feb. 15, 2022); EISA’s Election Observation Missions, EISA, https://www.eisa.org/epp123
124
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missions to Tunisia for the 2014 and 2019 elections, and has included
members of domestic Tunisian election observation groups on EISA missions
to train them.134 International IDEA partnered with Tunisia’s electoral
management body and the Organization of Arab Electoral Management
Bodies (ARAB EMBs) to provide training, risk management, organizational
development, and capacity-building to Tunisia’s electoral management
body.135 Tunisia joined International IDEA as its thirty-third member state in
December 2019, which will strengthen its ties to the international community
and help buttress its democratic government.136
As in Nepal, the international observation organizations worked
alongside domestic observation organizations, providing technical assistance,
training, and legitimacy to the domestic organizations. 137 They also
recommended steps the Tunisian government could take to improve
democracy in Tunisia, such as granting the franchise to members of the
military and amending candidate nomination laws to promote gender equality,
which were adopted by the government after the 2014 election.138
International groups also supported programs to improve political
involvement, especially by young people.139
Domestic observation groups established themselves quickly in the
leadup to the 2011 election, undertaking voter education efforts when
possible, but focusing primarily on election observation.140 Several domestic
groups participated in observation efforts during the elections over the past
decade, with some of the largest being Mourakiboun, the Association for
Transparency and Integrity in Elections (ATIDE), and the Chahed
Observatory.141 An impressive number of Tunisians participated in election
observation efforts during the elections: 13,392 domestic observers were
accredited in 2011, over 29,000 were accredited in 2014, and 17,500 were

eom.php; NDI, “Publications,” https://www.ndi.org/publications?country=1132 (last
visited Feb. 15, 2022).
134 EISA’s Election Observation Missions, supra note 133.
135 Emna Zghonda, Exploratory Mission to Tunisian Municipal Elections 2018 Organized
in Partnership with the Arab EMBs, INTERNATIONAL IDEA (Mar. 18, 2015),
https://www.idea.int/news-media/news/exploratory-mission-tunisian-municipal-elections2018-organized-partnership-arab; IDEA Signs MoU with Tunisia EMB, INTERNATIONAL
IDEA (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.idea.int/news-media/news/idea-signs-mou-tunisiaemb%C2%A0.
136 Tunisia Joins International IDEA as the 33rd Member State, INTERNATIONAL IDEA
(Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.idea.int/news-media/news/tunisia-joins-international-idea33rd-member-state.
137 OBSERVING TUNISIA’S 2019 ELECTION, supra note 117, at 15, 55.
138 OBSERVING TUNISIA’S 2019 ELECTION, supra note 117, at 15.
139 OBSERVING TUNISIA’S 2019 ELECTION, supra note 117, at 16.
140 OBSERVING TUNISIA’S 2011 ELECTION, supra note 118, at 40-41.
141 OBSERVING TUNISIA’S 2019 ELECTION, supra note 117, at 56.
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accredited in 2019 (the decrease from 2014 to 2019 was due primarily to a
lack of funding caused by the unexpectedly short election season in 2019). 142
Domestic election observation organizations have grown in Tunisia
from small (but enthusiastic and professional) groups in the 2011 election to
large, sophisticated organizations in the 2019 elections.143 In the 2019
election, many organizations cooperated to maximize their limited resources;
individual groups focused on specific aspects of observation (such as PVT’s,
voter registration, direct observation, etc.) and, once the election was
complete, published their joint findings and recommendations. 144 Domestic
observer groups were able to both attest to the validity of the election and
improve the election itself, as their many of their recommendations were
implemented by the government as the rounds of voting progressed.145
The extreme nature of the social and political situations in Nepal and
Tunisia could call into question any attempt to analogize experiences there to
other countries, much less an attempt to prescribe solutions for other countries
based on effective solutions there. It is because of these extremes, however,
that they serve as a worthy case study for the effectiveness of election
monitoring. Context is important, and a country’s political environment (and
therefore the proper remedies for issues within that country’s political
environment) can be shaped by numerous factors. The principles of election
observation used in Nepal and Tunisia, however, are not unique; as has been
shown, they have developed over roughly seventy years. Nepal and Tunisia
show that election observation, if done according to international standards,
can meaningfully strengthen democracy in a country by fostering popular
confidence in elections, raising social trust through encouraging collective
action, increasing voter turnout, and spurring popular engagement with the
political process.
III.

THE UNITED STATES’ ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND
OBSERVATION APPARATUS

This Part first discusses the election administration apparatus (or lack
thereof) in the United States, both on the state and federal levels. It then
examines a series of contested elections in U.S. history and discuss how some
of the problems in those elections could have been mitigated if a robust system
of election observation was in place. Since the modern election observation
system began after the creation of the UN, this Part only addresses U.S.
elections after the creation of the UN. In addition, because this paper is
arguing for a change in federal elections, this Part only examines federal
OBSERVING TUNISIA’S 2019 ELECTION, supra note 117, at 55, n.136, 57; OBSERVING
TUNISIA’S 2011 ELECTION, supra note 118, at 40.
143 OBSERVING TUNISIA’S 2019 ELECTION, supra note 117, at 55.
144 OBSERVING TUNISIA’S 2019 ELECTION, supra note 117, at 55-56.
145 OBSERVING TUNISIA’S 2019 ELECTION, supra note 117, at 57.
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elections, though several state elections could have been improved if they
were monitored (the 2018 Georgia gubernatorial election being one
example).146
A. Election Monitoring in the United States
“Conventional wisdom holds that the federal government plays
relatively little role in U.S. campaigns and elections.”147 That conventional
wisdom, however, is no longer wholly accurate. The federal government has
“steadily increased its presence in campaigns and elections in the past 50
years[,]” but the process has been neither simple nor organized.148 The
Election Assistance Commission (EAC), the Federal Election Commission
(FEC), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Defense (DOD),
and “component organizations comprising the Intelligence Community” are
all involved in campaigns and elections policy to some degree.149 Meanwhile,
“U.S. election administration occurs largely at the county level[,]” which
means that “regulations . . . vary widely across the [fifty] states and even
across counties within a single state.”150 This section first outlines the federal
elements of the United States’ election system and monitoring apparatus, then
it outlines the states’ election system and monitoring apparatus.
i.

The Federal Election System and Observation Apparatus

According to the Congressional Research Office’s report on the
federal government’s involvement in elections, “at least [twenty-two]
congressional committees; [seventeen] federal departments or independent
agencies (plus the Intelligence Community and the federal judiciary); [nine]
federal statutes; and several constitutional provisions can affect the federal
role in campaigns and elections.”151 While the federal government has a broad
role in ensuring voting rights, its primary roles in election administration are
to support the states and regulate campaign finance.152 The only two federal
146

See Jessica Taylor, Georgia's Stacey Abrams Admits Defeat, Says Kemp Used
'Deliberate' Suppression to Win, NPR (Nov. 16, 2018, 5:15 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/11/16/668753230/democrat-stacey-abrams-ends-bid-forgeorgia-governor-decrying-suppression (discussing allegations of fraud surrounding the
2018 Georgia gubernatorial election).
147 R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45302, FEDERAL ROLE IN U.S. CAMPAIGNS AND
ELECTIONS: AN OVERVIEW, summary (2018).
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 GUIDE TO ELECTION OBSERVER POLICIES IN THE US, supra note 64, at 1.
151 GARRETT, supra note 147, at 1.
152 See GARRETT, supra note 147, at 1, 3 (discussing the federal government’s role in
elections).
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agencies devoted solely to elections are the FEC and the EAC—the FEC
handles campaigns, while the EAC handles election administration. 153
The federal government’s role in elections stems both from the
Constitution and various statutes such as the Federal Election Campaign Act,
the Help America Vote Act, the National Voter Registration Act, the Voting
Rights Act, and others.154 While numerous statutes are important, some of
them have particular importance regarding election monitoring. The Help
America Vote Act (HAVA), for example, was passed in the aftermath of the
2000 election and is the primary federal statute dealing with election
administration.155 HAVA directed federal dollars to be given to the states to
improve their election systems, took the election administration functions out
of the FEC and created a new independent agency (the EAC) to perform those
functions, and charged the EAC to create voluntary election administration
standards for states to implement.156 HAVA also, however, barred the EAC
from making any rules, and tasked the DOJ with all enforcement authority
under the act, which kept the EAC from having any real power.157 Despite
their lack of teeth, the EAC and the FEC are the two federal agencies with the
most power over the elections process in the United States, though several
other agencies have subsidiary, context-specific roles in the election
process.158
With regards to election observation specifically, the Civil Rights
Division of the DOJ is currently allowed to send federal election observers to
oversee elections “by order of a federal court pursuant to Section 3(a)” of the
Voting Rights Act (VRA).159 Before the Shelby County decision, federal
observers were authorized in “153 counties and parishes in 11 states” that
were covered under the preclearance formula.160 Since the Court overturned
the preclearance formula in Shelby County, federal observation is presently

153

See GARRETT, supra note 147, at 19-20 (discussing the different roles of the FEC and
EAC).
154 See GARRETT, supra note 147, at 7-14 (explaining the statutory and constitutional
sources of the federal government’s power over elections).
155 See GARRETT, supra note 147, at 8 (discussing the provisions of HAVA).
156 See GARRETT, supra note 147, at 8 (outlining the provisions of HAVA).
157 See GARRETT, supra note 147, at 9 (explaining the limits HAVA put on federal power).
158 See GARRETT, supra note 147, at 19-26 (discussing agencies with roles in the election
process, such as the Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of
Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice,
Department of State, Department of Labor, Department of Treasury, Federal
Communications Commission, National Archives and Records Administration, Office of
Personnel Management, U.S. Access Board, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, U.S. Postal
Service, and various agencies within the intelligence community).
159
About Federal Observers and Election Monitoring, DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/about-federal-observers-and-election-monitoring (last visited
Feb. 22, 2022).
160 Id.
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allowed only in six counties.161 These observers serve as “neutral and impartial
observers of election-day procedures” who verify “compliance with the
federal voting rights laws[.]”162 While they have a “unique ability to help deter
wrongdoing, defuse tension, promote compliance with the law and bolster
public confidence in the electoral process[,]” their reach (and therefore effect)
has been greatly lessened since Shelby County.163 Though formal federal
observation has been limited, the Civil Rights Division does send attorneys
and staff members to monitor elections in a more informal fashion.164
The federal election administration system is complicated,
simultaneously monstrously large and woefully underpowered, and almost
comically inefficient and ineffective. Election observation is a good example
of the system’s problems: the VRA was passed by Congress, gave observation
authority to the DOJ (who outsources observer training to the OPM), was
limited in its application by the Supreme Court in Shelby County, and makes
no mention of the EAC—whose role is as the federal agency overseeing
election administration, which is the very thing election observers seek to
observe. The flaws of the system stem largely from the federal system of
government that the United States has and the decentralized nature of our
election system. To examine that decentralized system, one must study the
states’ election systems.
ii.

The State Election System and Observation Apparatus

There are “more than 10,000 [different election] administration
jurisdictions” in the United States, mostly because Article 1, Section 4 of the
Constitution says that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof[.]”165 Laws governing elections can vary “depending on
state election codes and county regulations” while the “entities that do the
rubber-meets-the-road functions of running an election are typically on the
county or city/town level.”166 This extreme decentralization can have both
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Id.; Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
About Federal Observers and Election Monitoring, supra note 159.
163 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, F ACT SHEET ON JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
FOLLOWING
SHELBY
COUNTY
DECISION
1,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/876246/download (last visited Feb. 21, 2022).
164
See About Federal Observers and Election Monitoring, supra note 159 (explaining the
various types and roles of federal election observers).
165 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; Election Administration at State and Local Levels, NSCL
(Feb.
3,
2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/electionadministration-at-state-and-local-levels.aspx.
166 GUIDE TO ELECTION OBSERVER POLICIES IN THE US, supra note 64, at 1; Election
Administration at State and Local Levels, supra note 165.
162

2022]

BACK TO BASICS

529

positives and negatives for the country’s elections as a whole. 167 Statutes such
as HAVA and the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) of 1993 have
standardized states’ election administration laws relative to a century ago, but
there is still a great deal of variation.168
Voting evolved into an increasingly complex act over time, which
led states to create increasingly complex procedures and use increasingly
complex technologies to standardize their election procedures, all of which
required increasingly complex bureaucratic apparatuses to oversee. 169 Each
state has a chief election official with ultimate authority over the state’s
elections, but (unsurprisingly) the identity of that official varies from state to
state—some states have the Secretary of State act as the chief election official,
some states have an appointed board act as the chief election official, and
some states split responsibilities between the Secretary of State and an
appointed board.170 A state’s chief election official works with the state’s
election office and the legislature to set election policy in the state, as well as
handle compliance with Federal law (especially HAVA), certify candidates,
provide voting machines to local election officials, troubleshoot issues on
election day, and tabulate statewide results.171
Local election officials—usually at the county level, but sometimes
at the city or town level—actually administer the elections.172 As at the state
level, local elections are administered either by an elected official, a board of

Election Administration at State and Local Levels, supra note 165 (“Critics say the
level of local control can lead to mismanagement and inconsistent application of the law,”
however, “this decentralization allows individual jurisdictions to experiment and innovate.
. . . The dispersed responsibility for running elections also makes it extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to rig U.S. elections at the national level, . . . [and it enables people to
hold] authorities in local jurisdictions accountable for the management of their own
elections.”).
168 See Election Administration at State and Local Levels, supra note 165 (discussing the
variation between States’ election systems).
169 See Election Administration at State and Local Levels, supra note 165 (Initially, voting
was a simple act where “[o]fficials would announce an election and voters would come
and vote.” Beginning in the late 1800s, innovations such as the secret ballot (as opposed to
the previous practice of parties giving ballots to voters), voter registration, and early voting
machines made voting more secure. These innovations, however, required increasingly
complex legal and administrative structures to facilitate them.).
170 See Election Administration at State and Local Levels, supra note 165 (discussing the
various ways states administer their elections).
171 See Election Administration at State and Local Levels, supra note 165 (discussing the
role of state election officials); see also KAREN L. SHANTON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45549
THE STATE AND LOCAL ROLE IN ELECTION ADMINISTRATION: DUTIES AND STRUCTURES 3
(2019) (discussing the state government’s policymaking role).
172 See Election Administration at State and Local Levels, supra note 165 (discussing the
local government’s role in elections).
167See
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officials, or by a combination of the two.173 These officials handle the day-today implementation of election policy: they “add eligible voters to the voter
rolls; design and print ballots; recruit and train poll workers; select and prepare
polling places; store and transport voting equipment; and count, canvass, and
report election results.”174
Since there are thousands of independent electoral jurisdictions
within the fifty states, it should come as no surprise that the laws concerning
who can observe elections, and what elements of the elections they are
allowed to observe, vary.175 Almost all states allow partisan citizen observers
and academic observers to be present at elections, while more than thirty states
allow international nonpartisan observers and domestic nonpartisan observers
to be present at elections.176 Though the accreditation process is not uniform
among the states, and in fact most states do not require formal accreditation
for nonpartisan observers, “40 states and [DC] have a formal
accreditation/appointments process for partisan citizen observers. . . .” 177
States that do have formal accreditation procedures for nonpartisan or partisan
observers normally do not have robust qualifications or guidelines for the
accreditation process.178 Observers’ rights vary between states; different states
give observers access to various combinations of pre-election, election day,
and post-election procedures.179
C. Applying International Election Observation Standards to Elections
in the United States
This section discusses how the decentralized nature of the United
States’ election system has led to issues in past elections, and shows that a
more robust system of election observer rights could have mitigated some of
those issues. That is not to say that a more robust system of election
monitoring would have changed the outcome of any of these elections;
election monitoring is, after all, “process oriented, not concerned with any
particular electoral result, and is concerned with results only to the degree that
173

See Election Administration at State and Local Levels, supra note 165 (comparing local
and state election administration apparatuses).
174 SHANTON, supra note 171, at 7.
175 See GUIDE TO ELECTION OBSERVER POLICIES IN THE US, supra note 64, at 2-3 (providing
a summary of the various state laws governing election observation, as well as an
explanation of the different types of election observation: partisan, nonpartisan,
international, and academic).
176
See GUIDE TO ELECTION OBSERVER POLICIES IN THE US, supra note 64, at 2-3 (explaining
the legal rights various observers have in the United States).
177 GUIDE TO ELECTION OBSERVER POLICIES IN THE US, supra note 64, at 6.
178 See GUIDE TO ELECTION OBSERVER POLICIES IN THE US, supra note 64, at 6 (Most states
do not have a “code of conduct, special training, or identification for observers.”).
179 See GUIDE TO ELECTION OBSERVER POLICIES IN THE US, supra note 64, at 7 (discussing
the variability in observational rights between states).
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they are reported honestly and accurately in a transparent and timely
manner.”180 The goal of this section is only to note ways that a robust election
monitoring apparatus could have improved these elections in a similar manner
that the election monitors in Nepal and Tunisia improved elections there.
i.

The 1948 Texas Senate Election

In 1948, Lyndon Johnson won an “87-vote landslide” against Coke
Stevenson in the Texas Senatorial Democratic primary runoff election.181 The
election was incredibly close, with initial results the morning after the runoff
indicating that Stevenson led Johnson by 854 votes.182 During the vote
recount, Stevenson’s lead narrowed to roughly 150 votes, when 202 votes for
Johnson were miraculously found in Alice, Texas—deep in the heart of the
territory controlled by political boss George Parr, a Johnson supporter. 183
When Stevenson went to Alice to investigate, he found some interesting
irregularities: “[t]he last 202 names on the rolls . . . were written in a different
color ink; the new names were listed in alphabetical order; the handwriting
was identical; some of the new voters claim they never voted.”184 Johnson’s
victory was secured by a Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari on the 5th
Circuit’s ruling that a federal court of equity could not interfere in a state’s
election processes.185
If international election observation standards were applied to this
election, this fraud could have been prevented, deterred, or conclusively
proven. Taking International IDEA’s standards for election observation as a
metric, there should have been a law that enabled “representatives of parties
and candidates and election observers [to be present] during the counting,
tabulation and consolidation of votes.”186 Furthermore, international standards
hold that party representatives and election observers should be present187
while ballots are being counted, and that all ballots should be securely stored
“until either the deadline for making legal challenges to the certified results
180

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 22, at 3.
Dale Baum & James L. Hailey, Lyndon Johnson's Victory in the 1948 Texas Senate
Race: A Reappraisal, 109 POL. SCI. Q. 595, 595 (1994).
182 See Dan Balz, The Mystery of Ballott Box 13, THE WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 1990),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/entertainment/books/1990/03/04/the-mysteryof-ballot-box-13/70206359-8543-48e3-9ce2-f3c4fdf6da3d/ (explaining the controversy
surrounding the election).
183 See Baum & Hailey, supra note 181, at 595-96, 1-2 n.1; Balz, supra note 182 (noting
the fortuitousness of finding missing ballots during the recount).
184 Balz, supra note 182.
185 Johnson v. Stevenson, 170 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, Johnson v. Stevenson,
335 U.S. 801 (1948).
186 INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL STANDARDS, supra note 14, at 77.
187 See INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL STANDARDS, supra note 14, at 78 (discussing the rights
of election observers).
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has passed or, in case a legal challenge is made, the final adjudication of such
a challenge is pronounced.”188
If a robust system of election observation was in place to oversee the
election, it would have made it much less likely that the election could have
been successfully influenced. Some could say that the mere presence of
observers, who often cannot do anything about the violations they see, would
not incentivize any change in behavior. However, that is not always true.
Legitimacy is important to governments and politicians, as evidenced by the
fact that many governmental systems that “fully intend to cheat nevertheless
invite scrutiny by monitors” because they want to avoid the stigmatization that
comes from not having monitors.189 If election observers can tabulate votes in
parallel with the official government tabulation, they can disseminate results
on their own, making it difficult for those who seek to manipulate those results
to do so effectively (as exemplified by NAMFREL in the Filipino elections of
1984 and 1986).190 This is akin to the concept of “soft power” in international
relations;191 election monitors may not be able to enforce election rules, but
they can create an environment where politicians are incentivized to play by
the rules. In this case, while observation could not have forced Johnson to play
by the rules, it is likely that stricter oversight would have made cheating much
more difficult, and therefore much less likely.192
ii.

The 2000 Presidential Election

The infamous events of November 2000 have been written about
voluminously, and for good reason. The Presidential election that year was
“the closest [one] in American history, with only several hundred votes in
Florida determining the winner out of more than 100 million ballots cast
nationwide.”193 George W. Bush defeated Al Gore in the election—with the
help of the Supreme Court—and became only the fourth president (and the
first since 1888) to win the electoral college but lose the popular vote.194
Florida, where the bulk of the drama played out, was originally called for
Gore, and Gore was even declared the presumptive winner by some

188 INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL STANDARDS,

supra note 14, at 80.
KELLEY, supra note 1, at 29.
190 BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 212-15.
191 See generally, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power, 80 FOREIGN POL’Y 153 (1990) (coining
the term “soft power” as the means by which countries can convince—instead of coerce—
other countries to take certain actions).
192 See KELLEY, supra note 1, at 130 (using data to show that “the presence of . . . monitors
is associated with improved election quality”).
193 Thomas E. Mann, Reflections on the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election, BROOKINGS (Jan.
1, 2001), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/reflections-on-the-2000-u-s-presidentialelection/.
194 See id. (contextualizing the 2000 election within the history of presidential elections).
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networks.195 As time went on though, Bush pulled ahead, and the Florida
Secretary of State declared Bush the winner.196 In response, Democrats pushed
for a recount of the votes, which Bush sued to stop.197 A recount was no easy
task; some ballots were “marked for third-party candidate Patrick Buchanan
in heavily Democratic precincts, suggesting they were cast by voters who had
thought they were voting for Gore,” while others were unclear because
“voters' attempt to make their choice had only succeeded in detaching a
portion of the perforated paper ("hanging chads" ) or merely denting – rather
than removing – the punch-out ("dimpled chads").”198 Eventually the Supreme
Court in Bush v. Gore stopped the recount, giving the election to Bush.199
Although people accepted the result, in deciding the election the
Court “damaged . . . [its] preferred image of itself as an institution far removed
from everyday partisan politics.”200 If the United States had implemented
international election standards, the Court may not have had to get involved
at all. If observers were there to oversee vote tabulation, they could have
identified issues on election day, and the state may have been able to resolve
those issues on its own. At the very least, if people knew there were issues
with the ballots (instead of merely confusion over who had won a tight race),
news organizations may not have called the state for Gore so early, which
would have precluded the narrative that Florida was “stolen” from Gore. If
observers had caught the “hanging chads” and other issues early enough, they
could have even pressured the polling stations to provide alternative means
for people to cast their votes, avoiding the issue altogether.
iii.

The 2008 Minnesota Senate Election

The 2008 Minnesota Senate Election was not resolved until June of
2009, when incumbent Norm Coleman conceded defeat to Al Franken, who
was declared the winner by “312 votes out of 2.9 million cast.”201 Coleman
had a 215-vote lead in the initial count, which was close enough to trigger a
195

See Ron Elving, The Florida Recount Of 2000: A Nightmare That Goes on Haunting,
NPR (Nov. 12, 2008, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/12/666812854/the-floridarecount-of-2000-a-nightmare-that-goes-on-haunting (explaining the 2000 election’s
tortured history of calls and recalls, concessions and retractions).
196 See id. (discussing the timeline of the controversial 2000 election).
197 See Election 2000 Timeline, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Dec. 17, 2000),
http://old.post-gazette.com/election/20001217pztimeline.asp (listing important dates in the
2000 presidential election saga).
198
Elving, supra note 195.
199 Elving, supra note 195 (discussing the resolution to the 2000 election in Florida); see
also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (holding that the recount could not continue).
200 Elving, supra note 195.
201 Josh Kraushaar & Manu Raju, Coleman Concedes Race to Franken, POLITICO (June 30,
2008, 2:14 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2009/06/coleman-concedes-race-tofranken-024383.
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mandatory hand-recount under Minnesota law.202 There were no guidelines
about how votes should be recounted, if improperly rejected absentee ballots
should be included, what constituted an improper rejection of a ballot, and
what to do about 133 votes that were lost at some point on election night. 203
The Minnesota canvassing board had to rule on those questions as they arose.
Once the state finally completed its recount and the canvassing board certified
that Franken was the winner by 225 votes, Coleman sued, which blocked
Franken from being able to be seated in the Senate.204 Coleman argued that
numerous ballots were wrongfully rejected and that the recount process
violated the Constitution’s equal protection clause because election officials
used different standards for counting various absentee ballots, and called for
the case to be “remanded to lower court so that more ballots could be
opened.”205 His arguments were rejected by the Minnesota Supreme Court,
however, which declared Franken the winner by 312 votes—Coleman
conceded shortly thereafter.206
Unsurprisingly, the results of the election were not well received by
the Minnesota Republican Party. In 2010, the Republican governor of
Minnesota alleged that roughly 1,000 felons may have illegally voted. 207
Attorneys for Coleman also alleged that the Minneapolis director for elections
found several ballots in her car that were wrongfully included in the tally. 208
202

See Rachel E. Stassen-Berger & David Orrick, Recount Begins in U.S. Senate Race;
Ritchie Hit With ‘Blizzard’ of Filings, TWINCITIES.COM (Nov. 18, 2008, 11:01 PM),
https://www.twincities.com/2008/11/18/recount-begins-in-u-s-senate-race-ritchie-hitwith-blizzard-of-filings/ (discussing Minnesota recount procedures).
203 See Kevin Duschere & Mark Brunswick, Senate Recount: 133 + 5 ÷ 87 = 1 Big Muddle,
STARTRIBUNE
(Dec.
12,
2008),
https://web.archive.org/web/20090324191758/http://www.startribune.com/politics/nation
al/senate/36043514.html?elr=KarksLckD8EQDUoaEyqyP4O%3ADW3ckUiD3aPc%3A
_Yyc%3AaULPQL7PQLanchO7DiUs; Minnesota U.S. Senate Election Recount (C-Span
television broadcast Dec. 13, 2008), https://www.c-span.org/video/?282885-1/minnesotaus-senate-election-recount&playEvent (explaining Minnesota’s lack of recount
procedures).
204 See Dawn Villella, Minn. Senate Race End Pushed Even Further Out, NBC NEWS (Jan.
4, 2009, 5:49 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna28495674 (Minnesota “state law
prevents officials from issuing an election certificate until legal matters are resolved.”).
205 In re Contest of General Election Held on Nov. 4, 2008, 767 N.W.2d 453 (2009); see
also Kraushaar & Raju, supra note 201 (discussing Coleman’s arguments).
206 See Kraushaar & Raju, supra note 201 (explaining the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
decision).
207 Ken Rudin, Minnesota Gov. Pawlenty Suggests Fraud in Franken-Coleman Election
Result,
NPR
(July
14,
2010,
4:38
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/politicaljunkie/2010/07/14/128519720/pawlenty-suggestsfraud-in-franken-coleman-election-result (discussing how the governor believed those
votes “flipped the election”).
208 See Opinion, Mischief in Minnesota? Al Franken’s Recount Isn’t Funny, WALL ST. J.
(Nov 12, 2008, 12:01 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122644940271419147
(outlining various allegations of voter fraud in the election).
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Others pointed out that many of the recount votes that were found, most of
which favored Franken, were from “liberal outposts” in Minnesota.209
Republicans also called into question the ability of Secretary of State Mark
Ritchie, a Democrat, to be unbiased in a recount where “miraculous
discoveries” of new votes continuously favored Franken over Coleman.210
While none of these allegations of fraud were necessarily true (the court did
not find any of the evidence Coleman offered to be compelling),211 the lack of
comprehensive recount standards and procedures—and the various court
cases needed to resolve those questions—made Republicans feel that the state
was “changing the rules after the election [was] over.”212
This election, much like the 2000 Florida recount, shows how
important it is for there to be comprehensive, accepted recount procedures in
place before controversies happen. A more robust system of election
monitoring could have alleviated concerns about “miraculous” ballot
discoveries by enabling observers to confirm that ballots were indeed
legitimate, and that the laws were followed. The lack of preexisting standards,
both for observers and recounts, led to court cases and delays of over two
months before the recount was even certified and the results challenged in the
State Supreme Court.213 This delay could have been avoided (or at least
shortened), and voter confidence in the election could have been enhanced, if
standards for election observation (and recounts, for that matter) were in place
before the election happened.
iv.

The 2020 Presidential Election

The 2020 election was unique for several reasons, not the least of
which being that it took place during a pandemic.214 Election day itself was
generally successful; while there were hiccups, there were less problems than
in the primaries earlier in the year.215 International election observers from the
209
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OSCE reported that the election was “competitive and well managed” despite
the difficulties from COVID-19.216 In fact, despite the fears and uncertainty
associated with the pandemic, the “number of people who voted—as a
percentage of eligible voters—was greater than it has been since 1900.”217
Although President Trump took an election night lead in several states, the
country watched over the next few days as Vice President Biden gradually
pulled ahead of Trump in key states and the Electoral College. 218
Trump’s early lead, as well as Biden’s slow but seemingly inexorable
increase in votes over the days following the election, stemmed in large part
from Trump’s repeated attacks on mail-in voting.219 A Pew Research poll
found that Trump supporters were “more than twice as likely than Biden
supporters to say they plan to cast their ballots in the presidential election in
person on Election Day.”220 As a result, Trump held the initial lead on Election
Day in several states that counted their in-person Election Day votes before
the early mail-in votes.221 Over 100 million early votes were cast in the
election,222 however, and because the majority of them were cast for Biden
instead of Trump,223 Biden was able to surmount Trump’s lead in several key
states. Most media outlets declared Biden the winner on Saturday, November
7.224
216 Org. for Sec. & Co-operation in Eur. Parliamentary Assembly [OSCEPA],

International
Election Observation Mission, United States of America – General Elections, 3 November
2020 1 (Nov. 4, 2020).
217 Nathaniel Persily & Charles Stewart III, supra note 214.
218 See Sabrina Siddiqui & Michael C. Bender, Joe Biden Vows to Unite America as
President, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/joe-biden-wins-2020-presidentialelection-ap-says-11604766914?mod=article_inline (last updated Nov. 7, 2020, 11:51 PM)
(discussing how Biden gradually overcame Trump in key swing states such as
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Georgia).
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The Trump campaign, however, was determined to fight the results
of the election. As his lead began to tighten in several states, Trump made his
displeasure known by saying states should “STOP THE COUNT!,”225
declaring that “[w]e have claimed, for Electoral Vote purposes, the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (which won’t allow legal observers) the
State of Georgia, and the State of North Carolina, each one of which has a
BIG Trump lead,”226 and signaled his intent to challenge the election’s results
by explaining that “THE OBSERVERS WERE NOT ALLOWED INTO THE
COUNTING ROOMS. I WON THE ELECTION, GOT 71,000,000 LEGAL
VOTES. BAD THINGS HAPPENED WHICH OUR OBSERVERS WERE
NOT ALLOWED TO SEE. NEVER HAPPENED BEFORE. MILLIONS OF
MAIL-IN BALLOTS WERE SENT TO PEOPLE WHO NEVER ASKED
FOR THEM!”227 and that he had “WON THIS ELECTION, BY A LOT!”228
Trump’s legal challenges focused on three key factors: “alleged
barriers to observing the counting of mail-in ballots, alleged votes cast by the
deceased and alleged backdated ballots.”229 His campaign’s early lawsuits in
Georgia, Michigan, and Nevada were thrown out by judges in those states, but
a suit to ensure poll watchers could “closely observe the vote-counting
process” in Pennsylvania was successful at the intermediate appellate court
level—though the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled against the Trump
campaign.230 Several of the suits have alleged mistakes in ballot counting and
complained of a lack of transparency in the vote collection and tabulation
process.231

bee69f9d1d32e84d68e6164ea956e67a (discussing the decision by media outlets to call the
race for Biden).
225 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 5, 2020, 9:12 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1324353932022480896. President Trump’s
tweets are no longer accessible on Twitter since his account was suspended, but websites
such as https://www.thetrumparchive.com/ have archived all of his tweets. For simplicity’s
sake, I will cite his tweets as if they were still on Twitter.
226 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 4, 2020, 4:56 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1324108200141082624.
227 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), T WITTER (Nov 7, 2020, 4:53 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1325194709443080192.
228 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 7, 2020, 10:36 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1325099845045071873.
229 Deanna Paul, Brent Kendall, & Corinne Ramey, Election 2020: What Are the Trump
Legal Claims?, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/election-2020-what-are-thetrump-legal-claims-11604876612?st=40juyyj02158498&reflink=share_mobilewebshare
(last updated Nov. 8, 2020, 10:32 PM).
230 See id. (discussing the various suits filed by or on behalf of the Trump campaign); Kelly
v. Commonwealth, 240 A.3d 1255 (Pa. 2020); In re Canvassing Observation 241 A.3d 339
(Pa. 2020).
231 See Miles Parks, Trump Election Lawsuits Have Mostly Failed. Here's What They Tried,
NPR (Nov. 10, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/11/10/933112418/the-trump-
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Several individuals went further than merely filing court cases;
President Trump, his legal team, and many of his supporters maintained
bellicose rhetoric—based primarily on conjecture and poor evidence—
asserting that the election was stolen.232 These conspiracy theories fueled
feelings of betrayal and anger among Trump’s supporters, culminating in a
pro-Trump mob storming the Capitol on January 6, 2020.233 It is likely that
some of the claims of election fraud which fueled this attack could have been
mitigated—or prevented—if international election observation standards had
been implemented for the election. International IDEA’s standards make clear
that election observers should have access to “observe election activities at all
levels and at all times, including counting and tabulation[.]” 234 The Trump
campaign’s lawsuits, and many popular conspiracy theories, address the exact
issues that International IDEA’s standards seek to clarify.235 If every state had
the election observation rights that International IDEA’s standards prescribe,
disputes about observer rights would have been simple: either observers were
given the access required by federal law, or they were not. As it is, the status
of observer rights is uncertain because every state (and in some cases
individual counties or cities) have their own rules for observer rights, and that
uncertainty is fertile ground for prolonged litigation and conspiracy theories.
Nationally standardized observational rights would simplify
litigation and discourage conspiracy theories by reducing uncertainty
surrounding the law, as well as by facilitating independent vote tabulation.
PVTs, as discussed in Part I, are important tools that observers can use to
independently verify the results of elections. If observers were granted robust
access to elections, they could independently count votes and report results
without waiting for official reports. This would provide more evidence of who
had won the election, which would further reduce uncertainty and aid in
preventing prolonged litigation. This reduction in uncertainty would also
encourage confidence in the election outcome, which would decrease public
support for prolonged litigation and increase pressure on the losing candidate
to accept the results.
It is worth noting that the presence of international OSCE observers
did not counteract the spread of disinformation and conspiracies surrounding
campaign-has-had-almost-no-legal-success-this-month-heres-what-they-ve (discussing
various lawsuits brought in Pennsylvania, Nevada, Michigan, and Georgia).
232 See, e.g., The Kraken: What is It and Why Has Trump's Ex-Lawyer Released It?, BBC
NEWS (Nov. 28, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2020-55090145
(discussing various conspiracy theories about the election, including one of the most
prominent (and inventive) of them; a series of lawsuits dubbed “Releasing the Kraken”).
233 See Mann & Restuccia, At the U.S. Capitol, supra note 15 (explaining the events leading
up to the riot at the Capitol, how the rhetoric of President Trump and other Republicans
led to the riot, and the damage the riot caused).
234 INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL STANDARDS, supra note 14, at 90.
235 See Parks, supra note 219 (discussing how observer rights were the basis of suits in
Michigan and Pennsylvania).
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the election. It should also be noted, however, that there were fewer
international observers in the country for this election than previous ones.236
Furthermore, while international election observation is certainly useful, it is
most useful when paired with robust, effective domestic election
observation237—which does not exist in the United States. A large,
standardized domestic observation system would have increased the efficacy
of foreign international observers, which in turn would have increased the
efficacy of the domestic observers.238 The inability of the OSCE observer
team to combat widespread disinformation shows that the United States needs
a strong system of domestic election observation, not that election observation
is ineffective.
IV.

IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL ELECTION MONITORING
STANDARDS IN THE UNITED STATES

The United States’ election monitoring system does not meet
international standards because it does not have one system—it has numerous
systems spanning over 10,000 separate jurisdictions.239 The United States’
heavily decentralized election system is a direct result of its federalist system
of government which gives states the ability to set the “Times, Places, and
Manner of holding Elections . . . .”240 The Constitution does, however, grant
Congress the ability to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators.”241 This Part argues that
Congress should pass legislation codifying elements of international electoral
standards for federal elections. This legislation should specifically create a
national accreditation process for any citizen to become a nonpartisan
observer for federal elections and should mandate certain observational rights
that all states must grant to federal election observers. Various objections are
then addressed and countered.

236

See Julian Borger, US Election to Have Far Fewer International Observers Than
Planned, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2020/sep/28/us-election-observers-europe-latin-america (explaining that the lesser
number of observers stemmed from COVID-19 concerns and the lack of an invitation to
Latin American observers).
237 See BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 234 (noting that international and domestic election
observation are “mutually reinforcing”).
238 See BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 242-45 (outlining various ways in which domestic
and international election observers benefit from coordination).
239 See Election Administration at State and Local Levels, supra note 165 (discussing the
United States’ election administration apparatus); INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL
STANDARDS, supra note 14, at 90 (“The law should provide clear and precise provisions
establishing the rights of observers[,]” which it does not do.).
240 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
241 Id.
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A. Outline of Proposed Federal Legislation Implementing International
Election Standards
Congress has passed several important pieces of legislation affecting
states’ election systems, from the VRA to HAVA. Passing the legislation is
not the issue (assuming, of course, that the political will to pass the legislation
is present); the issue is determining what the bill should include. Since
Congress would be merely implementing international election standards that
have been in place since 2002 (and developed since the 1940’s), 242 it would
not have to come up with standards on its own; it can rely on proven standards
that have worked in countries for decades.
International IDEA sets out exactly what laws governing election
observers should include:
The law should provide clear and precise provisions
establishing the rights of observers to inspect documents,
attend meetings, observe election activities at all levels and
at all times, including counting and tabulation, and to obtain
relevant certified copies of documents at all levels. The law
should also establish an expedited process for observers to
obtain corrective relief when an election management body
refuses to accredit an observer or observer group.
The legal framework must also be clear and precise
concerning what a domestic observer may not do, for
instance, interfere with voting, take a direct part in the voting
or counting processes, or attempt to determine how a voter
will vote or has voted. It should strike a balance between the
rights of observers and the orderly administration of the
election processes. But in no case should it hinder legitimate
observation, "muzzle" observers, or prevent them from
reporting or releasing information that has been obtained
through their observations.243
It also has a checklist to evaluate countries’ election observation legislation:
Does the legal framework allow accredited election
observers to observe all election processes? Does the legal
framework provide clear and objective criteria for the
accreditation requirements for election observers as well as
providing a well-defined role? Does the legal framework
242

See infra Part I for discussion of the creation of the international election observation
scheme.
243 INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL STANDARDS, supra note 14, at 90.
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provide clear criteria as to which governmental authority
accredits election observers? Does the legal framework
provide clear criteria and time-frames for applying for
election accreditation? Does the legal framework provide
clear criteria for the activities of election observers and as to
when and under what circumstances election observer status
can be revoked? Does the legal framework strike a balance
between the activities of election observers and the orderly
administration of elections? Are there any legal
requirements that could be too onerous for election observers
and serve to hinder legitimate observation?244
These questions outline exactly what legislation in the United States should
include to implement international election observation standards for
domestic observers. Implementing these robust standards would enable
United States citizens to engage in the domestic observation practices—such
as PVTs, election day checklists, and civil education drives—that have proven
so effective worldwide.245 As Part I discussed, nonpartisan domestic election
observers have benefits over international observers and domestic partisan
observers. However, since “virtually every [election monitoring organization]
has faced . . . charges of partisanship from parties, governments, election
officials, and even the international community,”246 Congress could easily
implement a national accreditation process for partisan observers if it feels
that polarization is so strong that nonpartisan observers would not be trusted
to truly be “nonpartisan.” Partisan observers from both parties would be able
to co-observe polling locations to “balance out” any perceived bias of
individual parties’ observers. Regardless of whether the observers are
nonpartisan or partisan, Part I has shown that domestic observers would foster
civic engagement with the political process, encourage public confidence in
elections, and deter fraud.
Legislation that codified the International IDEA’s standards into
federal law, implementing national standards for accreditation and access
(that could either be administered by the states or the federal government),
would be incredibly beneficial. It is worth mentioning, however, that it could
also be beneficial for Congress to create a national Electoral Management
Body (EMB) pursuant to International IDEA standards.247 The EMB could
combine the EAC and the FEC, as well as the election-related functions of the
DOJ and other government agencies, into one agency. It could standardize
election procedures throughout the United States, which would greatly reduce
244 INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL STANDARDS, supra note 14, at 92.
245 See infra Part I for a discussion of the efficacy of these practices.
246

BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 238.
See INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL STANDARDS, supra note 14, at 37-44 (outlining
appropriate standards for the mission, structure, and composition of an EMB).
247
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the issues related to the country’s current hodgepodge of laws. A full
argument for a national EMB, however, is outside the scope of this paper and
is mentioned here only to underscore the reality that the United States can take
concrete steps to strengthen its democracy—if the people have the will to do
so.
Congress could easily pass robust, effective, and impactful
legislation that would meaningfully improve federal elections in the United
States by implementing international election standards as articulated by the
International IDEA’s electoral standards and guidelines. The priority should
be a nationwide, standardized system of election observation accreditation
and observational rights for federal elections. Accredited observers should be
allowed to view all aspects of federal elections before, during, and after
election day, including campaigning, voting, and vote tabulation. This would
result in increased citizen engagement with democracy, increased confidence
in elections, and prevention and deterrence of prevent and deter fraud.
B. Objections
The effect that the proposed legislation would have on our election
system would be unparalleled since at least HAVA, and potentially since the
VRA. There are, of course, several arguments against Congress passing
legislation this consequential. This section will address some of those
arguments and demonstrate why they are unconvincing. The benefits of robust
election observation far outweigh any of the costs, and potential difficulties—
even those that seem insurmountable—are not so upon closer inspection.
i.

Election Observation is Ineffective

One possible objection to passing legislation allowing for election
observation for all federal elections is that election observation is ineffective.
After all, if observers merely observe what happens, they by definition cannot
intervene in the process. As Part II of this paper has shown, however, the
United States has an election problem. Thankfully, Part I has given decades
of evidence from numerous, diverse countries showing that election
observation has effectively addressed similar election problems in the past.
Domestic election observation is particularly effective because it involves
citizens of the country holding the election.248 “Beyond deterring fraud or
helping to push out autocrats, election monitoring has empowered civic

248

See BJORNLUND, supra note 13, at 242 (arguing that domestic observers are more
effective than international observers because they observe the election process longer, can
mobilize more people, and know their society and culture better).
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organizations in public affairs and transformed the way that many citizens
view national politics.”249
Domestic election observation is an end unto itself; it aims to
“enhance confidence of the public and contestants [which] increases the
chances that all sides will accept the results of a reasonably acceptable
process” by “[m]onitoring the preparation of electoral laws and regulations,
voter registration, campaigning, voting, vote counting, and the resolution of
election disputes.”250 It also, however, is a means by which “democratic
practices, values, and institutions” can be built, which in turn can “spur the
development of civil society and democratization.”251 History has proven, and
Part I has shown, that domestic election observation is effective at
accomplishing both of those purposes and improves elections in the countries
where it is practiced.
ii.

Even if Election Observation is Effective, It Does Not Justify
the Cost

Another possible argument against implementing international
standards of election observation is that the cost of doing so will be too high.
Legislation that institutes federal standards for observer accreditation and
rights will be one more thing the federal government must fund, either directly
or via subsidies to the states to run the program. That cost, so the argument
might go, would simply not be worth the benefit to the country.
The increasingly vitriolic polarization in the country, violent effects
of conspiracy theories such as QAnon,252 the international and national
increase in dissatisfaction with democracy, and the court battles and general
cloud of distrust and suspicion that hung over this past presidential election—
much of which was caused by anger resulting from disputes over election
observers’ access to vote tabulation—argues that we cannot afford not to
implement some sort of national election observation scheme. Also, with a
national budget of $4.79 trillion in fiscal year 2020,253 financing the
accreditation process (and any elements of the observation process that
required funding) would not be prohibitively expensive, especially given the
benefits.
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Congress would not have to hold long legislative hearings, nor
undertake costly legislative investigations into the efficacy of election
observation, because election observation has proven its effectiveness over
the decades of the 20th and 21st centuries. Congress would also not have to
go far for expertise on election observation; the Carter Center and the National
Democracy Institute, two global leaders in election observation, are based in
the United States. These groups, in addition to International IDEA, the OSCE,
and others, have already worked to create best practices for election
observation; Congress would only need to put them into appropriate
legislation. While that will undoubtedly be more difficult to do than to say,
Congress is supposed to do difficult things, and they have passed much more
complicated legislation in the past. Congress could also delegate much of the
implementation of the scheme to the states by offering them money contingent
upon their implementation of the new federal standards. This would save time
and energy, and likely money as well, by incentivizing the states to do the
harder work of implementing the new law.
iii.

Election Observation Violates Principles of Federalism

Another argument that could be raised against the creation of a
nationwide system of election observation for federal elections is that it goes
against our nation’s federalist system of government. The Constitution, after
all, gives states the authority to regulate elections,254 and (so the argument
might go) it is good to protect the states from federal infringement into a
traditionally state area of control. Furthermore, even though the Constitution
gives Congress the ability to alter state election laws, maybe Congress should
refrain from doing so.
The most obvious problem with that argument is that it is difficult to
say that the federal government is improperly taking away the states’ authority
over elections if the Constitution explicitly gave the federal government the
power to supersede the states’ authority over elections.255 The Elections
Clause is not like the Commerce Clause, where the vague language has caused
the Supreme Court to guard “traditional areas of state concern” from federal
encroachment.256 The language of Article I, section 4 is clear: “The Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,
shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress
may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the
254

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (The Elections Clause).
See id. (giving the federal government the ability to contravene states’ laws concerning
federal elections).
256 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577, 580 (1995); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 608, 615 (2000) (explaining that allowing the federal government to extend
authority to anything conceivably related to commerce would destroy the distinction
between federal and state governments).
255
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Places of chusing [sic] Senators.”257 There is, therefore, no fear that Congress
would be using a constitutional provision to expand its authority past the point
that the Framers intended, because the Framers explicitly gave it this
authority.
Since the Constitution so clearly gives Congress the ability to pass
legislation that affects federal elections, the only argument against doing so is
a normative one: Congress may do so, but it nonetheless should not do so,
because it would be better for states to retain control over observers’ rights.
The evidence and arguments in this paper serve as a response to that argument.
It is true that this legislation would take power from the states in some sense,
but the Constitution shows that authority over federal elections is something
that the states always only ever had in a conditional sense; they retained such
authority only to the extent that Congress chose not to exert its own, superior
authority. It might be more accurate to say that by asserting more control over
federal elections, the federal government is taking back power it had given to
the states. As it stands, state governments can exert control over how the
federal government—a distinct government from state governments—
operates its own elections. Surely the burden on federalism that would arise
from allowing one governmental entity to more comprehensively control its
own elections would be light, and more than justified by the benefits that
would follow from doing so.
iv.

Implementing International Election Observation Standards
Threatens the United States’ Independence

Another argument that could be raised against implementing
international election observation standards is that the United States should
not take legislative cues from the international community. The United States
is perfectly capable of governing itself—according to this argument—and
should not abdicate its governing authority by adopting international
standards wholesale. However, legislation that implemented international
standards to codify election observer rights for federal elections would have
to pass Congress. While this paper has discussed the benefits of election
observation, and has also pointed out the ease with which Congress could
apply international standards in the United States, Congress would
undoubtedly have some hearings, generate some legislative findings, and hold
some hours of debate on what exactly should be included in the legislation.
Legislation would likely not be a wholesale codification of pre-existing
standards, but instead be informed by the unique history and needs of the
United States. Thus, at no time would any foreign power have authority to
make laws that would be binding on United States citizens.
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The United States could hypothetically sign onto a treaty that
mandated its members provide certain rights for election observers, which
would have the practical effect of altering domestic law based on international
law.258 That approach, however, is not suggested in this paper. Implementing
international election observation standards in federal elections via federal
legislation would not take any authority from the United States, it would only
enable it to enjoy the benefits of robust election observation that other
countries already enjoy.
v.

Implementing International Election Observation Standards
in the United States Will Not Solve the Problem of Global
Dissatisfaction with Democracy

The final argument that this paper will address is that implementing
international standards in the United States will do nothing to solve the global
democracy crisis. Even if it helps increase satisfaction with democracy within
the United States, the democracy crisis is global, and this does nothing to help
global democracies. The United States, however, is still a leader in the
international community. In fact, the creation and expansion of election
observation was facilitated in large part by groups such as NDI and the Carter
Center, which are based in the United States. If the international community
sees the United States using election observation to improve its democracy,
other countries may be inspired to do the same. Additionally, even if other
countries’ rates of satisfaction with democracy do not improve, the various
benefits of democracy were discussed in the Introduction. The world is better
off when democracies are numerous and healthy, and it can be nothing but
beneficial to the international community for the United States to deepen its
commitment to democracy.
V.

CONCLUSION

Democracy is indeed facing a global crisis, and there is no one cure.
There are, however, steps we can take to improve democracies and increase
satisfaction with democracy worldwide. One step that has proven effective at
improving democracy, both from a technical standpoint and from a public
satisfaction standpoint, is election observation. Due to the federalist nature of
the United States’ government, its election observation laws vary from state
258

Some election observation groups point to the International Covenant on Civil and
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to state, and sometimes from county to county. This means that, while
observers are allowed in some jurisdictions, they are not allowed in all of
them. The international community, on the other hand, has robust standards
of election observation that have been developed over the past seventy-plus
years. Election observation done pursuant to these standards has helped
countries such as Nepal and Tunisia, which are transitioning from
dictatorships to democracies, to improve the quality and perception (both
domestically and internationally) of their democracies.
To take advantage of these benefits, the United States should
implement international standards by passing federal legislation—using the
International IDEA’s election standards as guidelines—outlining a standard
accreditation process and set of observational rights for domestic election
observers. Domestic observers should be allowed full access to observe every
facet of all federal elections. While domestic election observation is not a
panacea that will solve all democracy’s problems, its ability to deter and catch
fraud, increase public engagement with democracy, and foster public
confidence in elections would go a long way towards rejuvenating
democracy—both in the United States and worldwide.

